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Between Article III Courts and the Patent
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Emily N. Weber*

I. INTRODUCTION
The function of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) is to promote the industrial and technological innovation of
the nation and strengthen the economy through the preservation,
classification, and dissemination of patent information.1 The America
Invents Act (“AIA”) prescribed a multitude of supporting goals to best
promote innovation, such as preserving “quality patents,”2 “timely
consideration” of issues,3 maintaining “cost-effective” methods,4
preventing “frivolous litigation,”5 and preventing “uncertainty.”6 The
AIA ensures the “efficiency, objectivity, predictability, and
transparency” of the patent system.7 Part of this act included revamping
*

B.S., Mechanical Engineering, University of Missouri-Columbia, 2018; J.D.
Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2022; Associate Member,
Missouri Law Review, 2020–2021. A special thanks to Professor Dennis Crouch for
his guidance and to the editorial staff of the Missouri Law Review for their insightful
edits. An additional thanks to the team at Unified Patents for providing data and
guidance.
1
General Information Concerning Patents: Functions of the USPTO, USPTO
(Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-informationconcerning-patents [https://perma.cc/DCJ4-YSZM].
2
157 CONG. REC. S5428–29 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Coburn).
3
Id.
4
Audra Sawyer, Prejudicial or Probative: Determining the Admissibility of
Decisions in Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 98 B.U. L. REV. 263, 264 (2018).
5
157 CONG. REC. H4421 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith).
6
See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008) (explaining
that high level of uncertainty in patent law results in inefficient investment
incentives).
7
157 CONG. REC. S1092 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of Steven J.
Goldberg, Regulatory Law & Govt. Affairs, Vice President).
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the adjudicatory forum located within the USPTO, the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (“PTAB”), a body that decides patentability questions via
AIA trials.8 One type of is Inter Partes Review (“IPR”), a post-grant
review proceeding.9 IPR has the potential to promote innovation and
support the many goals of the AIA. However, that potential is
unrealized. This is in part because the policies surrounding IPR are
heavily influenced by the discretion of the acting USPTO Director (“the
Director”).10 This discretion has allowed external factors, such as trial
dates of district court litigation, to greatly affect the effectiveness of
IPR.11 In the past decade, institution of IPR has been inefficient,
subjective, unpredictable, and not transparent. This Note explores the
relationship between IPR and the discretion of the Director, the
consequences of that relationship, and how that relationship is influenced
by external factors.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Federal patent laws are rooted in the United States Constitution,
which grants Congress the power to “promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”12 The
United States Patent & Trademark Office derives its authority from this
provision and is responsible for granting and issuing patents.13 U.S.
patent laws are codified in Title 35 of the United States Code, which
governs all AIA trials in the USPTO.14
A patent must describe an invention in “full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art” to be able to
recreate and use the invention as well.15 The patent should conclude with
patent claims, the portion of the patent that confers patent protection.16
The language of the claims must be “definite” to ensure that the scope of
the claims is clear, the public is informed of the boundaries of what
constitutes infringement of the patent, and the USPTO is provided a clear
measure of what an applicant regards as the invention so that it can be
8

New
to
PTAB,
USPTO,
(Sept.
17,
2020),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/ptabinventors#:~:text=The%20America%20Invents%20Act%20(AIA,members%20and
%20administrative%20patent%20judges [https://perma.cc/CS3P-7NSY].
9
Id.
10
See e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 316(a).
11
See infra Part III.
12
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13
35 U.S.C. § 2(a).
14
See 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
15
35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
16
35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
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determined whether the claimed invention meets all the criteria for
patentability.17 Patent quality increases when the patent accurately
conveys the scope of the invention.18 Ensuring a patent complies with all
relevant statutes, including § 101 eligibility, § 102 novelty, § 103
obviousness, and § 112 specification requirements, ensures the quality of
the patent.19
Patent applications submitted to the USPTO are reviewed by patent
examiners – skilled scientists and engineers who determine whether a
patent should be granted.20 Examiners must determine if an invention is
worthy of patent protection; that is, the invention is new, useful, and
nonobvious.21 The USPTO employs over 8,300 patent examiners.22 In
2019, there were 669,434 patent applications filed at the USPTO.23
Patent examiners are allocated a pre-determined number of hours to
review each application based on the complexity of the subject matter
and the seniority of the examiner.24 Their pay is a pre-determined
calculation based on these factors.25 On average, a patent examiner will
spend nineteen hours reviewing an application, which includes reading

17

MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2173 (9th ed. Rev. 10, June
2020) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html)
[hereinafter, MPEP].
18
See Alan C. Marco et al., Patent Claims and Patent Scope, RSCH. POL’Y,
Nov. 2019, at 1, 2.
19
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112.
20
Become a Patent Examiner, USPTO JOBS (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://www.uspto.gov/jobs/become-patent-examiner
[https://perma.cc/C6PRG6SG].
21
See MPEP, supra note 17, § 2103 (Patent Examination Process).
22
Promoting the Useful Art: How Can Congress Prevent the Issuance of Poor
Quality Patents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Intell. Prop. of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 2 (2019) (statement of Andrew Hirshfeld, Commissioner
for Patents, United States Patent and Trademark Office).
23
U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963 – 2019, USPTO,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm
[https://perma.cc/EX2R-GJP6] (last updated Apr. 2020).
24
Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, The Failed Promise of User
Fees: Empirical Evidence from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 11 J.
OF
EMPIRICAL
LEGAL
STUD.
602,
615
(2014)
(available
at
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6329&context=faculty
_scholarship [https://perma.cc/R7M4-GQQQ]). For example, examining an
application for a fishing lure is allotted 16.6 hours, while a satellite communication
application is allotted 27.7 hours. Examination Time and the Production System,
USPTO,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/Examination%20Time%20and%20the%20
Production%20System.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3EM-8GQQ] (last visited Nov. 15,
2020). This allotment increases with complexity of the subject matter and decreases
with the seniority level of the examiner. Id.
25
Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 615.
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the application, performing a prior art search, drafting and responding to
office actions, and conducting an interview should the patent applicant
request one.26 Examiners are compensated under the assumption that this
calculation of pre-determined hours accurately reflects the time spent on
review.27
Two critical components of maintaining the efficiency, objectivity,
predictability, and transparency of the patent system are to ensure “the
timely consideration of patent applications and the issuance of quality
patents.”28 Patent quality improves when the most relevant prior art is
available for consideration.29 Prior art is any evidence that an invention
was already available to the public, which precludes the availability of a
patent.30 Patent protection is only available for ”new” inventions; if the
invention has already been described publicly, then it is not “new.”31
Unfortunately, due to the time constraints imposed on patent examiners,
the most relevant prior art of an invention is not always available for
consideration, leading to the issuance of low-quality patents. Patents of
low quality enable extortion of “unreasonable licensing fees from
legitimate businesses,” sparking a “perverse form of patent litigation
innovation.”32 Too many problematic patents “cast doubt on truly highquality patents.”33
This is not a new problem and there is no simple fix. The USPTO
has hired more patent examiners in an effort to combat this problem.34
However, it is almost impossible to prevent all low-quality patents from
slipping through the cracks. What is important is what can be done after
a low-quality patent is issued; this is where IPR shines.

26

Id.
Id.
28
157 CONG. REC. S5428–29 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Coburn).
29
Promoting the Useful Art: How Can Congress Prevent the Issuance of Poor
Quality Patents, supra note 22.
30
35 U.S.C. § 102.
31
35 U.S.C. § 101.
32
153 CONG. REC. H10275 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (letter from Safra Catz,
CFO, Oracle Corp.) (discussing the Patent Reform Act of 2007); 157 CONG. REC.
S949 (daily ed. Feb 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
33
157 CONG. REC. S949 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
34
USPTO Hiring Hundreds of New Patent Examiners, USPTO (May 3, 2021),
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-hiring-hundreds-new-patentexaminers [https://perma.cc/273J-XV9S].
27
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A. The Development of the Post-Grant Proceeding Known as Inter
Partes Review
The patent process does not end after a patent has been issued. One
may challenge a patent in civil litigation. 35 In 2011, Congress noted a
“growing sense that questionable patents [we]re too easily obtained” and
“too difficult to challenge” through the methods available at the time.36
To address these concerns, Congress passed the America Invents Act. 37
The AIA gave the PTAB the power to review patentability in a
proceeding known as inter partes review.38
Congress created IPR proceedings to provide an alternative to
litigation over the validity of previously granted patents by
“establish[ing] a more efficient and streamlined patent system that will
improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive
litigation costs, while making sure no party’s access to court is denied.”39
IPR allows petitioners to challenge the validity of one or more patent
claims before the PTAB without the need for civil litigation.40 By far the
most popular of the post-grant proceedings, IPR has become a significant
tool for challenging patent validity.41

B. Inter Partes Review on the Basis of Necessity
For many alleged infringers, defending an infringement claim in
civil litigation is out of reach financially.42 Alleged infringers, the
defendants, often agree to settle or license the patent as the lesser of two
evils compared to the costs of civil litigation.43 Typically in a patent
settlement, the accused infringer will agree to pay the patent owner,
stipulate to the patent’s validity, and promise not to challenge the patent
in the future.44 A sweeping number of patent lawsuits settle before trial –
roughly 90% are abandoned or settled.45 The patent cases that are most
likely to settle involve patents that have been the subject of eight or more

35

See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 281–99.
H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39–40 (2011).
37
New to PTAB, supra note 8.
38
Id.
39
157 CONG. REC. S1361 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
40
Sawyer, supra note 4, at 264.
41
Id.
42
Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND.
L. REV. 375, 386 (2014).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
David Pridham, The Patent Litigation Lie, FORBES (Apr. 13, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidpridham/2017/04/13/the-patent-litigationlie/?sh=1deb77937ea9 [https://perma.cc/JT8B-PJ63].
36
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lawsuits.46 Trial courts encourage settlement through pressure by
individual trial judges, court-ordered settlement conferences, and the prosettlement jurisprudence developed by the Federal Circuit.47 An
alternative to litigation thus became necessary to prevent defendants
from pigeon-holing themselves into settlements.48
As evidence of this necessity, when cases involving litigationweathered patents are adjudicated rather than settled, the patents
experience a higher rate of being invalidated.49 This higher rate of
invalidation is attributable to entities referred to as “patent trolls,” who
abuse the civil litigation process with low-quality patents.50 A patent
troll is a person or company that attempts to enforce patent rights against
accused infringers beyond the actual value of the patent through
frivolous or vexatious litigation. 51 Patent trolls are sometimes referred to
as non-practicing entities (“NPE”), as they often do not manufacture
products or provide services related to the patents at issue.52 Congress
addressed the issue of patent trolls during arguments concerning the
AIA.53 Congress acknowledged the existence of a “trolling situation” in
which low-quality patents became the basis of a whole legal industry,
creating a “huge nuisance value,” flooding the courts with unnecessary
litigation.54 While high-quality patents are necessary for innovation, lowquality patents damage the economy by granting protection over
products and processes that were not inventive.55
46

John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 689 (2011).
47
La Belle, supra note 42, at 380.
48
See 153 CONG. REC. E773–74 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Berman); see also 157 CONG. REC. S936 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Grassley).
49
Allison et al., supra note 46, at 687.
50
Dennis Crouch, Chief Judge Rader: Improving Patent Litigation, PATENTLYO (Sept. 27, 2011), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/rader-patent-litigation.html
[https://perma.cc/4ZFF-KCDW].
51
Id.
52
Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy
Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 165
(2006). It is important to note that not all NPEs are patent trolls, but it is a very rare
situation for non-patent-troll NPEs to assert their patents against alleged infringers.
Id. (“The non-patent related behavior of the patent holder plays a critical role in
assessing whether it is a troll.”).
53
See 153 CONG. REC. H10276–77 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Lofgren); 157 CONG. REC. S1365 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Schumer); 157 CONG. REC. H4486 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep.
Jackson Lee).
54
153 CONG. REC. H10271 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Conyers).
55
157 CONG. REC. S1349 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(“Just as high-quality patents are the key to innovation, low-quality patents are a
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C. Inter Partes Review in Context

The Framers of the Constitution were aware of the dangers of
an invalidly issued patent, fearing that such patents would not
reward innovation but instead impede commerce. 56 The Patent
Clause of the Constitution is “both a grant of power and a
limitation,” and Congress has a duty to enforce the balance
between encouraging innovation and stifling competition through
the awarding of patents that do not “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts . . . .” 57 Part of preventing stifling
competition includes decreasing the number of “defectively
examined and therefore erroneously granted patent[s].”58 At the
same time, property rights and the presumption of validity on
behalf of issued patents are at the core of a patentee’s (the
innovator’s) interest.59 IPR contains several procedural limitations
to enforce a balancing act on behalf of patentees and those
questioning the validity of a patent. 60 A number of these
provisions are designed to limit the use of post-grant proceedings
as a delaying tactic and to mitigate the negative impact these
proceedings have on efforts to enforce a patent. 61

drag on the economy because the provide monopoly rents over products or processes
that were not inventive.”).
56
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 315 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
57
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8; see also 157 CONG. REC. S5374–75 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2011) (letter from Judge
Michael McConnell, former member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit and current Director of the Constitutional Law Center at Stanford Law
School).
58
Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (1985); cf. Oil States
Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018)
(“[T]he decision to grant a patent is a matter involving public rights—specifically,
the grant of a public franchise. Inter partes review is simply a reconsideration of that
grant, and Congress has permissibly reserved the [US]PTO's authority to conduct
that reconsideration.”).
59
Robert Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong
Patent Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, RSCH. POL’Y, July 1998, at
273, 273–84.
60
See generally 35 U.S.C. § 311 et seq.
61
154 CONG. REC. S9987 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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1. Procedural Limitations of Inter Partes Review
The interests of patent owners are protected by the procedural
limitations of IPR.62 Congress created a higher threshold for initiating an
IPR, in addition to procedural safeguards “to prevent a challenger from
using the process to harass patent owners.”63
IPR follows an oppositional model, under which the petitioner
carries the burden of showing a claim is not patentable.64 Congress
raised the prior threshold for initiating a claim to a new standard that
requires “a showing of a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that a patent is
invalid.”65 This “allow[s] the [US]PTO to avoid accepting challenges
that were unlikely to win in any event.”66 A higher threshold was
necessary to “weed out marginal challenges” and to preserve the
resources of the USPTO.67 Additionally, the oppositional model allows
for speedier adjudication of claims.68 This is due in part to the higher
threshold forcing parties to front-load their cases, allowing these
proceedings to be resolved quickly.69
One of the primary efficiency gains promoted by IPR results from
the strict timing rules the process imposes.70 After a petition is filed, the
patent owner has three months to file a response.71 After the response is
filed, the PTAB then has another three months to decide whether to
institute – hear – an IPR proceeding.72 If the PTAB declines to institute a
proceeding, then no review will occur.73 If the IPR is instituted, the
PTAB is required by statute to issue a written decision on the matter
within one year of institution. 74 These statutorily prescribed deadlines

62

See generally 35 U.S.C. 311 et seq.
157 CONG. REC. S952 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
64
154 CONG. REC. S9987 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
65
35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
66
157 CONG. REC. S1326 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2011) (statement of Sen. Sessions).
67
157 CONG. REC. S1041 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
68
154 CONG. REC. S9987 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
69
157 CONG. REC. S1041 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). To
“front-load” is “to assign costs or benefits to the earl stage of (such as a contract,
project, or time period.” Front-load, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (accessed Apr. 6,
2021),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/front-load
[https://perma.cc/DXP5-C79S].
70
35 U.S.C. §§ 313, 314(b), 316(a)(11).
71
Id.
72
35 U.S.C. § 314(b).
73
35 U.S.C. § 318 (a).
74
35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11).
63
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contrast the lengthy process of civil patent litigation. Patent validity
claims in civil courts take nearly thirty months to even get to trial.75
Only certain matters are eligible for IPR petition. Unlike in civil
litigation, a petitioner in an IPR is limited to challenging a patent based
on 35 U.S.C. § 102’s novelty requirement or on 35 U.S.C. § 103’s nonobviousness requirement.76 The novelty requirement in § 102 prevents
patentability if the claimed invention was already publicly available, the
invention is not new, and the current applicants are not inventing matter
that should be awarded exclusive patent rights.77 In other words, an
existing disclosure anticipates the claimed invention. The obviousness
requirement of § 103 is similar, although instead of being “identically
disclosed” under § 102, it bars the receipt of a patent where the invention
“as a whole” would have been considered obvious by a person having
“ordinary skill in the art” when considering available prior art.78 Only
patents and printed publications may be used as prior art references to
challenge a patent in an IPR. 79
These limitations improve the efficiency of IPR. Additionally, IPR
includes an estoppel provision to prevent the inefficient re-litigation of
issues already decided.80 Arguments that are “raised or reasonably could
have been raised” by parties during an instituted IPR cannot be raised
later in litigation.81 This estoppel provision simplifies co-pending
litigation because it removes many obviousness and anticipation issues
from litigation because they have already been addressed in IPR. 82

2. Cost-Saving Measures of Inter Partes Review
Congress intended IPR to be a “faster, less costly alternative[] to
civil litigation to challenge patents.”83 Costs to litigants have been
reduced with IPR, which is an “in-house system” that addresses claims of
patent infringement before a civil suit in district court becomes
necessary.84 On a per-suit basis, civil patent litigation costs an average of

75
See Chris Barry et al., 2024 Patent Litigation Study: As Case Volume Leaps,
Damages Continue General Decline 16, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP (July
2014).
76
35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
77
35 U.S.C. § 102 (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless… the claimed
invention was… available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention…”).
78
35 U.S.C. § 103.
79
157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl
80
35 U.S.C. § 315(e).
81
Id.
82
157 CONG. REC. S952 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
83
Id. (emphasis added).
84
157 CONG. REC. S1350 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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at least $1.5 million through discovery or about $3 million in its entirety,
while IPR costs between $200,000 to $750,000 total.85
During
discussions of the AIA, legislators stressed the detrimental effect of
costly dispute resolution, as it “decrease[s] innovation incentives and
work[s] against the patent system’s goal of encouraging technological
progress.”86
Limitations imposed on IPR for the benefit of efficiency likewise
decrease its cost through a substantial decrease in procedural hurdles,
such as lengthy discovery times.87 IPR limits discovery to “the
deposition of witnesses submitting affidavits or declarations” and “what
is otherwise necessary in the interest of justice.”88 The strict timeline
required for IPR similarly decreases costs.89 Inventors consider the cost
of defending intellectual property rights when deciding whether to
innovate.90 When that cost is high, inventors will be less likely to find
the potential benefit of innovation to outweigh the potential costs.91 IPR
ensures inventors have the opportunities to resolve patent disputes on the
merits instead of being strong-armed into settlement by vexatious
litigation.92

3. Other Benefits and Concerns of Inter Partes Review
Many judges are not prepared to handle patent cases. Cases
regarding technical issues and complex factual situations can be better
managed when concentrated within a single decision-making body.93
IPR provides a specialized body to review issues of patentability,
removing the concern regarding “juries [in civil litigation, which] are
believed to have difficulties understanding patent cases” and are
therefore more likely to rely on “tangential factors” than juries evaluating
85
See Meaghan H. Kent et al., 10 Reasons Every Defendant in Patent
Litigation Should Consider Inter Partes Review, MONDAQ (April 26, 2014),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/309504/Patent/10+Reasons+Every+Defenda
nt+in+Patent+Litigation+Should+Consider+Inter+Partes+Review
[https://perma.cc/2NYN-WQBR]; see also Chris Neumeyer, Managing Costs of
Patent
Litigation
(Feb.
5,
2013),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/02/05/managing-costs-of-patentlitigation/id=34808/ [https://perma.cc/ST3A-WNF8].
86
Sawyer, supra note 4, at 267.
87
Id.
88
35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5).
89
Sawyer, supra note 4, at 267.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the
Efficiency and Accuracy of Patent Adjudication; An Empirical Analysis of the Case
for a Specialized Patent Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 402–03 (2011).
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matters that are easier to understand.94 Additionally, such a specialized
adjudicative body aligns legal doctrine across the legal landscape –
reducing forum shopping.95 Coordinated legal doctrine also creates
predictable results which prevents inconsistent rulings from across the
various circuits.96
Before 2018, IPR and civil litigation practiced two different claim
interpretation standards. Previously, IPR followed the same standard
that is currently used by examiners when reviewing patent applications,
the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard.97 In 2018, IPR began
following the same standard that is used to construe claims in a civil
action in district court, the “ordinary and customary meaning” standard.98
This standard is narrower.99 Under this standard, patent claims are given
“the meaning that [a] term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the
art in question at the time of the invention.”100 However, while the
construction standard is now the same, there remains a difference in the
evidentiary standard between IPR and civil litigation. 101 The evidentiary
standard in IPR assigns the petitioner the burden to prove unpatentability
by a preponderance of the evidence.102 In district courts, the accused
infringer must prove that the patent in question is invalid by clear and
convincing evidence.103

4. The Challenge of Co-Pending Litigation
When co-pending litigation poses a threat of inconsistent decisions,
§ 315(a)(2) calls for an automatic stay of the civil action if the IPR
petitioner filed a civil action on or after the date on which the IPR
94

Sawyer, supra note 4, at 267.
Kesan & Ball, supra note 93, at 403–04. “Forum shopping” refers to “the
practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or court in which a claim might
be heard. A plaintiff might engage in forum-shopping, for example, by filing suit in
a jurisdiction with a reputation for high jury awards or by filing several similar suits
and keeping the one with the preferred judge.” Forum-shopping, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
96
Kesan & Ball, supra note 93, at 403–04.
97
Id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
98
Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial
Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51340 (Oct. 11,
2018) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
99
See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC, 582 F. App’x 864, 869
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential) (“The broadest reasonable interpretation of a
claim term may be the same as or broader than the construction of a term under the
Phillips standard. But it cannot be narrower.”).
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012).
103
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 598 F.3d 831, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
95
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petition was filed.104 Otherwise, there is no automatic stay, but the patent
litigation defendant will often file a motion to stay the co-pending
litigation while awaiting the results of the PTAB’s decision. 105 When
discussing the AIA, legislators “expected that district judges will
liberally grant stays of litigation once a proceeding is instituted.” 106
Since the creation of IPR, the granting of stays regarding co-pending
litigation has been subject to much debate.107

D. The Power Balance
The AIA grants PTAB wide latitude in carrying out its goals.108
Such latitude is necessary because institution of inter partes review is
discretionary.109 The authority to institute an IPR is found in § 314(a),
which states that the Director “may” institute an IPR if “there is a
reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at
least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 110 The Director has the
authority to prescribe regulations which set forth “the standard for the
showing of sufficient grounds to institute a review under section
314(a).”111 Section 312 further enumerates the permissive nature of an
IPR when discussing the requirements of an IPR petition, stating a
petition “may only be considered if” certain requirements are met.112
Even if these threshold requirements are met, there is no obligation for
the Director to institute the petition. 113
This discretion, however, is not absolute.114 The AIA delegated the
duty of prescribing regulations regarding the rules and procedures of the
PTAB to the Director of the USPTO.115 In prescribing regulations for
institution decisions, the Director shall “consider the effect of any such
regulation on the economy, the integrity of the patent system, the
104

35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2).
See generally Douglas B. Wentzel, Stays Pending Inter Partes Review: Not
in the Eastern District of Texas, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 120 (2016).
106
157 CONG. REC. S1379 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
107
Wentzel, supra note 105.
108
See generally 35 U.S.C. § 311 et seq.
109
See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“the PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding”).
110
35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (emphasis added).).
111
35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(2).
112
35 U.S.C. § 312(a) (emphasis added). The requirements of a petition for
inter partes review are: (1) paying a fee, (2) identifying all real parties in interest, (3)
identifying each claim challenged, including grounds and evidence, (4) other
information the Director requires through regulation, and (5) providing copies of the
documents required to the patent owner. Id.
113
Id.
114
See 35 U.S.C. § 316(b).
115
35 U.S.C. § 316.
105
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efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office to
timely complete proceedings instituted under this chapter.”116 Proposed
rules are to be published in the Federal Register to give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule-making process through
submissions.117 After these submissions and other relevant matters are
considered, the USPTO may incorporate the rules alongside a concise
general statement of their bases and purpose.118 The PTAB can also
make new rules through adjudication.119 This process is akin to a court
announcing rules or standards when it decides a case.120 Sometimes, the
PTAB hands down “precedential decisions,” which establish binding
authority concerning major policy or procedural issues.121 Very rarely is
a decision deemed precedential. Only 102 written decisions have been
deemed precedential as of the publication of this article.122 Whether or
not a case is precedential is determined by the Precedential Opinion
Panel.123 USPTO Director is a member of this panel, and the panel
operates at his or her discretion.124

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The discretionary authority of the PTAB has highlighted a concern
regarding the implementation of its rules. These concerns question
whether or not such authority promotes the efficiency, objectivity,
predictability, and transparency of the patent system, which are vital
goals of the AIA in its efforts to further innovation.125

116

Id.
5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), (c).
118
5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
119
Michael Xun Liu, Patent Policy Through Administrative Adjudication, 70
BAYLOR L. REV. 43, 54 (2008).
120
Id.
121
Precedential and Informative Decisions, USPTO (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/precedential-informative-decisions
[https://perma.cc/M6Q3-4BDK].
122
Alphabetical Listing of Precedential Decisions, USPTO (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/decisions-and-opinions/precedential
[https://perma.cc/4ZTG-SQVP] (last modified May 11, 2021). The first precedential
decision was designated in 1994. Id. In 2020 alone, the PTAB issued 508 written
decisions. PTAB Trial Statistics, USPTO (last visited July 18, 2021),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ptab_aia_fy2020_roundup_appe
ndix.pdf [https://perma.cc/KGE7-MDYW].
123
Precedential
Opinion
Panel,
USPTO
(Nov.
7,
2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appealboard/decisions/precedential-opinion-panel [https://perma.cc/2TTF-9BUL].
124
Id.
125
157 CONG. REC. S1092 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of Steven J.
Goldberg, Regulatory Law & Govt. Affairs, Vice President).
117
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A significant enlargement of the Board’s authority occurred in the
IPR NHK Spring Co. v. Intriplex Techs., Inc.126 The Board denied a
hearing under § 325(d) based on several non-exclusive factors which
weighed the findings of the examiner during prosecution and the
arguments of the petitioner.127 However, the PTAB further based its
denial on § 314(a), interpreting the discretionary power of the statute to
permit the Board to “consider and weigh additional factors that favor
denying institution.”128 Here, the PTAB considered a parallel civil suit
occurring in district court an “additional factor” for its decision not to
institute.129 The Board stated that “the advanced state of [a parallel]
district court proceeding” in which the petitioner had raised the same
invalidity challenges “weighs in favor of denying the [IPR] Petition
under § 314(a).”130 The patent owner in NHK argued it would be more
efficient to apply the same standard of claim construction as if it were
argued in the federal circuit, as parallel cases are inherently inefficient.131
The Board in Apple, Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc. expanded upon the § 314(a)
discretionary rule promulgated in NHK.132 There, the Board cited to the
denial of institution described in NHK under § 314(a).133 The Board
clarified that “NHK applies to the situation where the district court has
set a trial date to occur earlier than the Board’s deadline to issue a final
written decision in an instituted proceeding.”134 In a case where the
district court has set a trial date after the Board’s deadline to issue a final
written decision in an instituted proceeding, “the Board may be less
126

NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Technologies, Inc., No. IPR2018-00752,
Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018).
127
Id. at 11–12. The Board enumerated several non-exclusive factors in the
decision to decline the IPR under § 325(d):
(a) the similarities and material differences between the
asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the
cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated
during the examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art
was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art
was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between
the arguments made during examination and the manner in which
Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the
prior art; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how
the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and
(f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in
the Petition warrant reconsideration of prior art or arguments. Id.
128
Id. at 20.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 20.
131
Id. at 19.
132
Apple, Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., No. IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 3 (PTAB Mar.
20, 2020).
133
Id. at 2.
134
Id. at 3.
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likely to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) based on district court
trial timing depending on other factors.”135 The Board here enumerated
six factors to balance when evaluating an argument for discretionary
denial under NHK due to an earlier trial date:
(1) whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may
be granted if a proceeding is instituted;
(2) proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected
statutory deadline for a final written decision;
(3) investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties;
(4) overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel
proceeding;
(5) whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel
proceeding are the same party; and
(6) Other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of
discretion, including the merits.”136

Since NHK and Fintiv, these discretionary factors have been
repeatedly cited in written decisions as a basis on which to deny IPR.
Between February 2019 and September 2020, the PTAB made 1,974
institution decisions of IPR petitions. Of these petitions, 809 were
denied institution..137 Of those petitions which weredenied, 304 were
denied based on procedural matters.138 Of the petitions procedurally
denied, 194 were denied under § 314(a).139 And of the § 314(a) denials,
at least 48 were denied on NHK/Fintiv co-pending litigation grounds.140
Although there are only a few affected cases, those impacted are
growing in number and denials on these grounds frustrate the pursuit of
justice. These types of denials based on co-pending litigation are non135

Id.
Id. at 5–6.
137
PTAB Search: Cases by Phase and Status, UNIFIED PATENTS,
https://portal.unifiedpatents.com/ptab/analytics/case-level/by-status-andphase?sort=-filing_date&type=IPR&up_institution_date=2019-02-01--2020-09-30
(last visited Sept. 9, 2021); see also Board Decisions, USPTO,
https://developer.uspto.gov/ptab-web/#/search/decisions
[https://perma.cc/G5YZRQL3] (last visited Sept. 9, 2021).
138
PTAB Search, supra note 137; see also Board Decisions, supra note 137.
139
PTAB Search, supra note 137; see also Board Decisions, supra note 137.
140
Calculations completed by author with assistance of data provided by
UNIFIED PATS., unifiedpatents.com [https://perma.cc/TW5H-UKHM] (last visited
Sept. 9, 2021) (calculations on file with author); see also Board Decisions, supra
note 137.
136
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appealable, as recently confirmed by the Federal Circuit.141 Petitioners
can request a rehearing but only within thirty days of denial.142 Such a
frustration arose in Uniloc 2017 v. Google LLC, where the Board denied
Google’s petition based on co-pending litigation in the Eastern District of
Texas.143 Google had filed a motion to transfer the district court case,
which, if successful, would alter the trial date used to deny institution. 144
The motion was likely to be successful; just a few months prior, where
Google filed a similar motion challenging venue in another matter, the
Federal Circuit held that the Eastern District of Texas was not a proper
venue for patent cases filed against them.145 Google used the likelihood
of a new trial date as an argument to support their request for
rehearing.146 The PTAB denied their request for rehearing, without
addressing the probability of transfer.147 In the end, the motion to
transfer was granted, the trial date was changed, and Google was left
without an opportunity to try the case in IPR.148 A few months later,
another IPR was instituted by a different party challenging the same
patent, where all claims were determined to be unpatentable.149 For
claims that were substantively unpatentable, is it really fair to prevent
entities from challenging patents on the basis of procedural reasons, such
as indefinite trial dates?
In re Cisco Systems, Inc., 834 Fed. App’x 571, 573–74 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
Parallel denials were also issued in Google LLC v. Uniloc 2017 LLC, No. 20-2040
(Fed. Cir. 2020) (order denying writ of mandamus) and Apple Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd.,
No. 20-2132 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (order denying writ of mandamus). See also Dennis
Crouch, Federal Circuit: No Appeal of IPR Institution Denial, Even If Denied for
Extra-Statutory
Reasons,
PATENTLY-O
(Nov.
2,
2020),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/11/federal-institution-statutory.html
[https://perma.cc/XY45-RKXD]. A decision to institute or deny institution of an IPR
on the basis of the one-year time bar is non-appealable under Thryv v. Click-to-Call
Technologies. Thryv v. Click-to-Call Technologies, 140 S.Ct. 1367, 1375 (holding
that an institution decision under § 314(a) is non-appealable on the basis of the §
315(b) time-bar).
142
37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)(2).
143
No. IPR2020-00115, Paper 8 at 2 (PTAB May 12, 2020) (decision denying
institution of inter partes review); see generally Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Google LLC,
2:18-cv-00502 (E.D. Tex. June 19, 2020).
144
Motion to Transfer Venue, Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Google LLC, 2:18-cv00502 (E.D. Tex. July 1, 2020), ECF No. 55.
145
See In re Google, 949, F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
146
Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Google LLC, No. IPR2020-00115, Paper 9 at 11
(PTAB Apr. 27, 2020) (Petitioner’s request for rehearing).
147
Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Google LLC, No. IPR2020-00115, Paper 10 at 8
(PTAB May 12, 2020) (decision denying petitioner’s request for rehearing).
148
Order Granting Motion to Transfer Venue, Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Google
LLC, 2:18-cv-00502 (E.D. Tex. June 19, 2020), ECF No. 277.
149
Vudu, Inc. et al. v. Uniloc 2017 LLC, No. IPR2020-00677, Paper 10
(PTAB Jan. 19, 2021).
141
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IV. DISCUSSION
Roughly eight million patents have issued since 1963.150 The harsh
reality of the U.S. patent system is that many of these were later found
invalid and never should have been granted.151 This reality will
assuredly continue to apply to patents that have yet to issue. Examiners
are overworked, have little time allotted for patent examination, and are
underpaid.152 These conditions allow invalid patents to slip through the
cracks. Invalid patents hinder “the progress of science and useful arts”
as outlined in the Constitution. 153 Post-grant proceedings are useful tools
to protect American interests from invalid patents.154 However, what is
considered an “American interest” to protect is subject to
interpretation.155
The AIA implemented IPR to “establish a more efficient and
streamlined patent system” with the goals of “improv[ing] patent quality
and limit[ing] unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.” 156
Managing both patent quality and cost were significant goals of the
bill.157 However, in many recent PTAB decisions, the Board, under its
IPR discretion in § 314(a), justified its decisions not to institute on the
basis of speed, citing conflicts created by the potential of co-pending
litigation.158 Congressed drafted the AIA explicitly with the idea of copending litigation in mind, as evidenced by § 315, which discusses the
relationship of an IPR filing to other proceedings or actions.159 The
Board in NHK even noted that “an objective of the AIA… [is] to provide

U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963 – 2019, supra note 23.
For example, 111 patents in 2020 were determined to contain no patentable
claims after being challenged in IPR. PTAB Trial Statistics: FY20 End of Year
Outcome
Roundup,
USPTO,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ptab_aia_fy2020_roundup.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WG2X-C9PT] (last visited July 26, 2021).
152
According to a 2007 survey of patent examiners by the Government
Accountability Office, 70 percent of patent examiners over the prior year worked
unpaid overtime to meet their production goals, some more than 30 extra hours in a
2-week period. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 666.
153
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8.
154
United States Patent and Trademark Office, Post Grant Review,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trials/post-grant-review [https://perma.cc/7GSZYJC3].
155
Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank C. Cross, Stability, Predictability and the
Rule of Law: Stare Decis as Reciprocity Norm.
156
157 CONG. REC. S1349 (daily ed. March 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
157
Id.
158
See e.g., Google LLC v. Personalized Media Communications, LLC, No.
IPR2020-00722, Paper 22 (PTAB Aug. 31, 2020).
159
35 U.S.C. § 315(d) (“During the pendency of an inter partes review, if
another proceeding or matter involving the patent is before the Office…”).
150
151
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an effective and efficient alternative to district court litigation.” 160
Nonetheless, the statute grants the Director the authority to determine the
manner in which such co-pending litigation is addressed.161 Recently,
the percentage of procedural denials has almost doubled from 2016
(5.5%) to 2019 (12.7%).162 A significant portion of that rise is due to the
Board exercising its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).163 The written
decisions denying institution on grounds of co-pending litigation
acknowledge the malleability of trial dates; many of the decisions noted
that the trial dates used to deny institution were uncertain. 164 The
decisions also noted concerns with trial dates due to the uncertainties
created by the COVID-19 pandemic, yet still denied on § 314(a) copending litigation grounds.165 The quick rise in § 314(a) denials, in
combination with the malleability of the trial dates of co-pending
litigation upon which many of these IPR denials are based erodes the
predictability of IPR.166

A. External Components: The Influence of District Court Litigation
The influences of external components are best illustrated by
comparing the Eastern and Western Districts of Texas. The Eastern and

160
NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Technologies, Inc., No. IPR2018-00752,
Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (citing General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon
Kabushiki Kaisha, No. IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017)).
161
35 U.S.C. § 315(d) (“[T]he Director may determine the manner in which the
inter partes review or other proceeding or matter may proceed, including providing
for stay, transfer, consolidation, or termination of any such matter or proceeding.”).
162
2019
PTAB
Annual
Report,
UNIFIED
PATENTS,
https://portal.unifiedpatents.com/ptab/annual-report?year=2019
[ttps://perma.cc/56A8-T7H8] (last visited July 14, 2021).
163
Id.
164
Intel Corp. v. CSLI Technology, IPR2020-00106, Paper 17 at 7 (PTAB
May 5, 2020) (“There is some uncertainty as to whether trial will actually occur on
[the date stated].”); Ethicon, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Tex. System, IPR201900406, Paper 27 at 10 (PTAB June 10, 2020) (where the Board had received notice
that the trial date had been suspended, but expected trial to occur within a year, “in
all likelihood.”).
165
Intel Corp. v. CSLI Technology, IPR2020-00106, Paper 17 at 8 (PTAB
May 5, 2020) (“[T]here is uncertainty about what effect the coronavirus disease
2019 (‘COVID-19’) pandemic will have with respect to the trial date.”); Google
LLC v. Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC, IPR2020-00722, Paper 22 at 7 (PTAB
Aug. 31, 2020) (“[W]e decline to speculate whether that date will change due to
COVID-19 disruptions.”).
166
See Intel Corp. v. CSLI Technology, IPR2020-00106, Paper 17 at 8 (PTAB
May 5, 2020); Google LLC v. Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC, IPR202000722, Paper 22 at 7 (PTAB Aug. 31, 2020).
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Western Districts of Texas have become hotbeds for patent litigation. 167
The Western District of Texas is a choice venue, as the ability to achieve
expedited trial deadlines that are useful to patentees seeking to avoid
PTAB review is a feature recently exploited by such patent owners.168
The Western District allows plaintiffs to select Waco when filing their
complaints, assuring that a particular judge (Judge Albright) will be the
one to hear their cases.169 Because of this, forum shopping in the patent
field has boomed, and in just a few years the Waco division has become
the number-one patent litigation venue in the United States.170 The Waco
Division of the Western District of Texas received only twenty-eight
patent cases in 2018, the year Judge Albright took the bench.171 In 2020,
only two years later, it received 813 patent cases, or almost 22% of the
patent cases filed nationwide.172
In both the Eastern and Western Districts, cases are rarely
transferred
out-of-district.173
Additionally,
these
districts
174
disproportionately deny stays awaiting institution of IPR.
As of
August 31, 2015, the grant rate for stays pending IPR in the Eastern
District of Texas was only 15.6%, 4.65 times less than the nationwide
average of 72.5%.175 More than 96% of patent infringement suits in the
167

Paul R. Gugliuzza & J. Jonas Anderson, How the West Became the East:
The Patent Litigation Explosion in the Western District of Texas, PATENTLY-O
(Sept.
15,
2020),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/09/litigation-explosiondistrict.html [https://perma.cc/7GCX-HDYD].
168
Jason Rantanen, How the West Became the East: The Patent Litigation
Explosion in the Western District of Texas, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 15, 2020),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/09/litigation-explosion-district.html
[https://perma.cc/YCG7-PKPK].
169
Amended Order Assigning the Business of the Court, W.D. Tex. (Dec. 4,
2019),
https://www.txwd.uscourts.gov/wpcontent/uploads/Standing%20Orders/District/Amended%20Order%20Assigning%20
Business%20of%20the%20Court%20120419.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZU7K-9X38].
There are only two judges in Waco, Texas for the Western District, Judge Alan
Albright in addition to a magistrate judge. Judges’ Directories and Biographies:
Waco, U.S. DIST. COURT W. DIST. TEX., https://www.txwd.uscourts.gov/judgesinformation/judges-directory-biographies/
[https://perma.cc/9NH9-56K4]
(last
visited Nov. 3, 2020).
170
David G. Henry, Western District of Texas Gets an Upgrade: A Look at the
New
Waco
Courtroom,
IPWATCHDOG
(Jan.
20,
2021),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/01/20/western-district-texas-gets-upgrade-looknew-waco-courtroom/id=129125/ [https://perma.cc/6XSK-26YB].
171
Rantanen, supra note 168.
172
2020 Patent Dispute Report: Year in Review, UNIFIED PATS. (Jan. 1, 2021),
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/insights/2020-patent-dispute-report-year-in-review
[https://perma.cc/9XPZ-K8SH].
173
Rantanen, supra note 168.
174
Wentzel, supra note 105, at 137.
175
Id.
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Eastern District are brought by NPEs.176 This trend shows no indication
of slowing.177 Between September 16, 2012 and August 31, 2015, 66.7%
of patent infringement cases were filed by NPEs, and 30.0% were filed
by NPEs in the Eastern District.178 In the first eight months of 2015,
68.0% of patent infringement suits were filed by NPEs, and 44.7% were
filed by NPEs in the Eastern District.179 Even though the use of IPRs is
increasing, the number of successful motions to stay district court
litigation pending the outcome of IPRs is now decreasing despite initially
being quite favorable.180 These two districts have curated their patent
dockets and have drastically altered the patent system in the span of only
a few years.181
While the number of petitions denied on NHK grounds represents a
small fraction of overall IPR denials, this low quantity should not prevent
investigation of the validity of the patent at issue for the interests of
justice.182 Additionally, this trend is rising.183 Taking a look at the
corresponding district court trials of the forty-eight § 314(a) denials
decided between February 2019 and September 2020, those 48 denials
corresponded to twenty copending district court trials. 184 Only one of the
trial dates used in the related institution decisions was accurate.185 Five of
the IPRs corresponded to district court trial dates that were less than
fifteen days delayed from the trial date used to deny institution.186
Nineteen of those IPRs correspond to trials that occurred long after the
expected trial date listed in the institution denial.187 However, what is
most concerning is the fact that sixteen of these IPRs correspond to six

176

Id. at 120–21.
Id.
178
See id. at 123. Douglas B. Wentzel collected this data by searching the RPX
Patent Litigation Database and Docket Navigator for all patent infringement suits
filed between September 16, 2012 and August 31, 2015. Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
See supra notes 143–49.
183
Robert Colletti et al., The Recent Rise of Discretionary Denials at the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, JDSUPRA.COM (Nov. 19, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-recent-rise-of-discretionary-97285/
[https://perma.cc/9MBK-TRHH] (“In 2016, the Board denied just 5 petitions…in
2017, that number increased to 15; by 2018, it was 45; in 2019, it was 75, and by the
end of 2020, the number of §314(a) denials will likely exceed 150.”). See also PTAB
Procedural Denials and the Rise of § 314, UNIFIEDPATENTS.COM (May 13, 2020),
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/insights/2020/5/13/ptab-procedural-denial-and-therise-of-314 [https://perma.cc/3YV4-UV46].
184
See supra note 140.
185
Id. (calculations on file with author).
186
Id. (calculations on file with author).
187
Id. (calculations on file with author)
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district court trials that have yet to be heard.188 In fact, the case that
serves as the namesake of this rule¸ Fintiv, is expected to be heard seven
months after the original trial date used to deny institution of IPR; if the
trial is not delayed, Judge Albright will finally hear the case just around
the time of this article’s publishing.189

188

Id. (calculations on file with author).
Amended Order Resetting Jury Trial for 10/4/2021, Fintiv, Inc. v. Apple,
Inc., 1:19-cv-01238 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 217.
189
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Figure 1. Illustrative Comparison of the Copending District Court
Cases from the Eastern and Western Districts of Texas Following
Institution Denial of IPR (Where IPR Institution was Decided Between
February 2018 and September 2020)190

190

See supra note 140. After identifying the IPRs where institution was denied
due to copending litigation, the expected trial dates used in institution denial were
compiled and then compared to current district court trial status (last checked Sept.
9, 2021).
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Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the Eastern District of Texas presides
over a large portion of the trials that are heard relatively on time; on the
other hand, Judge Alan Albright of the Western District presides over a
portion of cases where the trial date used to deny institution under NHK
has shifted significantly or has not even been decided yet.191 This is
expected to increase, largely attributable to his advertising of the
Western District as a patentee-friendly forum.192
The issue of co-pending litigation is not the only concern with these
two districts; it adds another layer to the fact that these two districts
rarely transfer cases and are disproportionately against granting stays
awaiting IPR.193 In essence, the Eastern and Western Districts of Texas
operate on a completely different spectrum from the rest of the country.
That is not to say that the Eastern and Western Districts act similarly.
While the Eastern District has at least some sense of predictability, as it
maintains trial dates, the Western District has no such tendencies. This
vastly disparate operation highlights the issues of the discretionary
balancing game. This style of case management is arguably efficient, as
co-pending litigation can impart conflicting rulings but can also leave
objectivity, predictability, and transparency unaddressed. This erosion
undermines the proceeding as a useful tool to verify patent validity.
Such admittedly unpredictable trial dates should not be used as a basis to
deny IPR institution, especially in venues that have a history of
unpredictability. A predictable patent system ensures that patent drafters
and readers alike are able to properly interpret the scope of a patent. A
decline in the predictability of the system opens the door for
manipulation.

B. Internal Components: The Discretionary Authority of Institution
Decisions
The predictability and transparency of the adjudication process is
undermined when the Board has largely unchecked rulemaking power.194
High use of precedential decisions concerning major policy or procedural
issues injects uncertainty into the patent system.195 Uncertainty works
against the patent system’s goal of encouraging technological progress
by making innovation more costly, which in turn can decrease innovation
incentives.196 The Board has used precedential decisions to promulgate

191

See supra note 140.
Rantanen, supra note 168 (exhibiting that the unchecked rulemaking power
of the board is an issue of NHK/Fintiv).
193
Rantanen, supra note 168; Wentzel, supra note 105, at 137.
194
See also PTAB Procedural Denials and the Rise of § 314, supra note 183.
195
Id.
196
Sawyer, supra note 4, at 267.
192
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rules at a significantly higher rate in recent years (See Fig. 2).197
Designation of PTAB decisions as precedential reached an all-time high
in 2019 at seventeen decisions, more than four times the amount of any
previous year.198 This recent uptick in precedential decisions leads one
to question whether the PTAB is increasing the predictability and
transparency of the system or if it is injecting uncertainty.

Figure 2. Precedential Decisions Over Time.199
The Board is ostensibly acting within its statutory authority.
However, the discretion promulgated by the Board departs from the
intent of the legislature.200 The discretion of decision making provided in
§ 314(a) combined with the flexibility of the regulations provided by the
current Director in § 316 cultivates the Director’s position as one of
significant influence and control.201 The President appoints the Director
of the USPTO with the advice and consent of the Senate. 202 This makes
the position inherently partisan. Patent rights are a highly contentious
subset of property rights.203 Allowing such partisanship does not provide
objectivity and predictability when this position is subject to change
197

See infra Figure 2.
Id.
199
Graph created from data found in Alphabetical Listing of Precedential
Decisions, supra note 122.
200
157 CONG. REC. S951 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
201
35 U.S.C. § 314(a); 35 U.S.C. § 316.
202
35 U.S.C. § 3(1).
203
Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics
Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 59, 72–73 (2005).
198
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every presidential election.
Political figures should not “inject
uncertainty into the patent system which will take years of litigation to
sort out and that creates unknown ramifications for American
innovation.”204 When the discretionary authority provided to the
Director has significant and immediate effect, the Director has the
capability to inject an unhealthy amount of uncertainty into the patent
system.
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S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 75 (2008) (minority views by Sens. Coburn,
Specter, Grassley, Kyl, and Brownback).
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C. The Underlying Issue
The discretionary authority of federal judges combined with the
discretionary authority of the USPTO Director creates a double-layered
opportunity for discretionary decision-making.205
However, this
treatment of IPR is not unsupported by the legislation; IPR was meant to
be an “alternative” to civil patent litigation, not a substitute.206 The
authority granted to the Director when prescribing rules governing IPR is
purposefully broad.207 Arguably, the Board has not stepped outside of
the bounds of this authority.208 Similarly, a federal judge’s discretion is
purposefully broad.209 When setting trial dates, a judge must issue a
scheduling order “as soon as practicable… unless the judge finds good
cause for delay.”210 Such “good cause” is subject to the interpretations of
the judge.211 However, an issue arises when the discretionary actions of
a regulatory agency provide the opportunity for a single district court
judge to substantially affect the entire patent system.212 This overlap in
discretionary authority provides an opportunity to push patent policy in
ways not contemplated by each entity, the PTAB and federal district
courts, when viewed individually.
District judges that pushed the limits of their discretion in
conjunction with the near-unchallenged authority of the PTAB’s
institution decisions – while technically within prescribed statutory
authority – opens the door for abuse.213 Of all the discretionary factors
promulgated by NHK/Fintiv, it is surprising that the history of the judge,
notably their predictability in retaining the trial dates as originally set, is
not considered.214 These discretionary rules counteract the desire of
205

See 35 U.S.C. § 2; In re Apple Inc., 979 F.3d at 1336.
157 CONG. REC. S952 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Grassley).
207
See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
208
It is important to note a current case in the Northern District of California
regarding the NHK/Fintiv discretionary authority and notice-and-comment
rulemaking in Apple Inc., v. Iancu, arguing that such rulemaking authority conflicts
with the Administrative Procedure Act. Apple Inc., v. Iancu, No. 5:20-cv-6128, 2021
WL 411157, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2021). Additionally, a case questioning the
constitutionality of the appointment of PTAB judges was granted certiorari, after the
Federal Circuit ruled in 2019 that the current statutory scheme for appointing
administrative patent judges to the PTAB violated the Appointments Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 551 (2020).
209
In re Apple Inc., 979 F.3d at 1337–38.
210
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(2).
211
Id.
212
Gugliuzza & Anderson, supra note 167.
213
Gugliuzza & Anderson, supra note 167.
214
Apple, Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., No. IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB
Mar. 20, 2020).
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legislators to “mak[e] sure no party’s access to court is denied” when
such rules are used to effectively bar access to IPR. 215 This discretionary
NHK/Fintiv trial date rule encourages patent owners to file a civil suit in
a district court where they will assuredly receive a trial date that would
overlap with the PTAB’s written decisions, thus triggering the PTAB’s
discretionary rule and ultimately leading to denial of institution. Such
actions effectively bar use of IPR.

V. CONCLUSION
The PTAB is still a relatively new adjudicatory board in the patent
review process.216 IPR is a useful process by which alleged infringers
can defend their business and prevent forced settlements from patent
trolls.217 There are arguments that IPR is an avenue that allows easy and
repeated attacks on patent owners, but the threshold requirements for IPR
and limitations regarding novelty and obviousness make that a non-issue
for truly valid patents.218 IPR is limited to considerations of novelty and
obviousness, has a statutory deadline, and provides an alternative to
defendants who feel strong-armed into settlement.219 However, the
PTAB is testing the waters with its implementation of discretionary
reasoning, that is arguably out of line with the intentions of the AIA.220
The PTAB’s discretionary reasoning is overbroad and underinclusive at
the same time, as justifications for decisions become easy to defend
using the six factors of § 314(a), yet these justifications ignore the
history of the trial judge, which undermines the predictability of the
system.221 The availability of IPR as an alternative to civil litigation has
the potential to improve patent quality and decrease litigation costs. But
the regulations governing the proceeding depend upon the ideology of
the USPTO Director, which is a politically partisan position. 222 It is
undeniable that such authority promulgated to the Director provides an
opening for partisan desires to dominate, especially when combined with
the discretionary authority of federal district judges. Subjecting a large
portion of the PTAB’s power to the changing ideologies of the Directors
decreases the efficiency, objectivity, predictability, and transparency of
the patent system. This level of authority should be questioned;

215

157 CONG. REC. S1349 (daily ed. March 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
See supra note 207.
217
See Landu, supra note 206.
218
See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b); Malone, supra note 106.
219
See supra Part II–C.
220
See Colletti et al., supra note 183.
221
See supra Part IV.
222
35 U.S.C. § 3(1).
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significantly, the trial-setting accuracy of district court judges should not
be ignored when evaluating the NHK/Fintiv factors.
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